Bounded arithmetic, proof complexity and two papers of Parikh  by Buss, Samuel R.
ELSEVIER Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1999) 43-55 
ANNALS OF 
PURE AND 
APPLIED LOGIC 
Bounded arithmetic, proof complexity 
and two papers of Par&h’ 
Samuel R. Buss * 
Depurtment of Muthemutics. Unicersit~~ qf Culifomiu. Sun Diego, Ln Jolla, CA Y.?093-01 I_‘, l’S.,l 
Received 29 April 1997; received in revised form 3 June 1997; accepted 12 August 1997 
Communicated by S.N. Artemo\ 
Abstract 
This article surveys R. Parikh’s work on feasibility, bounded arithmetic and the complexity of 
proofs. We discuss in depth two of Parikh’s papers on these subjects and some of the subsequent 
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1. Introduction 
This article discusses two papers of Rohit Parikh on feasibility and bounded arith- 
metic and on the complexity of proofs: the first is the 1971 paper “Existence and 
Feasibility in Arithmetic” [30] and the second is the 1973 paper “Some Results on 
Length of Proofs” [31]. Both papers were seminal and influential and led to large rc- 
search areas which are still active and fruitful 25 years later. The first paper addressed 
the intuitive concept of feasibility, discussed the infeasibility of exponentiation, and 
presented the original definition of bounded arithmetic (I&). The second paper solved 
a special case of a conjecture of Kreisel’s and additional problems in proof speed-up. 
and introduced important tools for the analysis of the complexity of proofs in first-order 
logic and other formal systems. 
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We will discuss first the “feasibility” paper, in Section 2. Section 3 takes up the 
“length of proof” paper, and Section 4 concludes with a discussion of the connections 
between these topics. 
2. Existence and feasibility in arithmetic 
The most important aspect of the 197 1 “feasibility” paper was arguably the intro- 
duction of the first-order theory of bounded arithmetic, now referred to as IAO. This 
paper starts by considering the issue of whether a fast-growing function such as expo- 
nentiation gives rise to numbers which are intuitively infeasible or non-constructible. 
Of course, from the point of view of classical proof theory, exponentiation is a rather 
slow-growing function - it is, of course, a primitive recursive function and finitists and 
intuitionists certainly accept all primitive recursive functions. On the other hand, there 
are a number of reasons to doubt the feasibility of exponentiation, and a number of 
logicians and philosophers have doubted the concrete existence of large numbers such 
as (j72577” formed with exponential terms. (See [45] and the later works building on 
Parikh’s bounded arithmetic of [26, 38, 391.) And for computer scientists, the com- 
putational infeasibility of exponentiation was already well recognized. Par&h endorsed 
this infeasibility of exponentiation, saying 
. . there is a large element of phantasy in conventional mathematics which one 
may accept if one finds it pleasant, but which one could equally sensibly (perhaps 
more sensibly) reject. 
and the principle themes of the paper were to give justifications for viewing exponen- 
tiation as infeasible in formal theories of arithmetic and to give an alternative formal- 
ization of arithmetic (i.e., bounded arithmetic) which would be closer to feasible. 
There are four aspects of the “feasibility” paper that we shall discuss: (i) the sug- 
gestion that bounded formulas and linear space computations are feasible, whereas 
exponentiation is not, (ii) the definition of bounded arithmetic, (iii) the “Par&h the- 
orem” for bounded arithmetic, and (iv) the extent to which exponentiation is needed 
for the arithmetization of metamathematics. 
(i) In Section 3 of the “feasibility” paper, Parikh presents a model-theoretic result 
illustrating the gap between exponentiation and the feasible operations of addition and 
multiplication in models of arithmetic. Specifically, consider the axioms 
.f(& 0) = 1. f(.G y + 2) =.0x, y) f(x,z>, 
.f(X,~b)) =.x j-(-L y), .fk Y z> = f(.f(x. Y>tZ) 
which uniquely characterize f(x,,~) as the exponentiation function x?’ in the standard 
integers. Par&h proved, however, that there is a non-standard model M of T/z(N) and 
two distinct functions ,f, and ,f2 on A4 both of which satisfy the above four axioms 
for all values ,‘i, y,z E M. 
In the next section, Par&h proposes an “anthropomorphic” system based on classes 
of predicates and functions which are more feasible than exponentiation. His first class 
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of predicates is the predicate which can be defined by bounded ,foumulas of the 
form 
where the terms ti involve only the variables yr, . , ynz and where B is a quantifier- 
free formula. Nowadays, the notation do is commonly used to denote either the set 
of bounded formulas or the set of predicates definable by bounded formulas; it is also 
now known that this set of predicates is precisely the set of predicates recognized 
by constant alternation, linear time Turing machines, which are called the linear-time 
hierarchJ3 predicates. 
The linear time hierarchy was first introduced by Smullyan [41] in the guise of 
‘rudimentary predicates” Shortly thereafter, Bennett [2] proved that Smullyan’s rudi- 
mentary predicates are precisely the predicates that can be defined with a bounded 
formula over the integers (using a m-adic representation of integers). During the later 
196Os, a number of people investigated the relationship between the rudimentary pred- 
icates and computational complexity classes (see, e.g., [19]). In later work, subsequent 
to Parikh’s “feasibility” paper, the rudimentary predicates were studied extensively by 
Wrathall [44], Harrow [17], NepomnjaSEii [27], and Wilkie [42]; both Wrathall and 
Wilkie essentially proved that this class was equal to the linear time hierarchy, but 
Lipton [23] was the first to explicitly prove the fact that the set of do predicates is 
equal to the linear time hierarchy. 
Parikh was definitely interested in connections between computational complexity 
and the do-formulas, but instead of discussing the linear-time hierarchy (since, in any 
event, the linear-time hierarchy was not yet defined, much less known to be related 
to the do-hierarchy), he turned to the class of predicates which are recognized by 
deterministic linear bounded automata (dlba’s), or in modern day terminology, to the 
class of predicates which can be computed in linear space by a deterministic Turing 
machine. Parikh called the linear space predicates “concrete”: he noted the theorem 
of Myhill that every do-formula defines a concrete predicate and also noted that the 
converse inclusion was open (and this is still open today!). 
From a present-day computer science viewpoint, the suggestion that concrete 
(linear-space) predicates are “feasible” seems odd, since it is commonly conjectured 
that some of these predicates require exponential time to compute. Likewise, the class 
of d,j-predicates, which equals the linear-time hierarchy, is conjectured to contain pred- 
icates which require exponential time to compute; for instance, the NP-complete predi- 
cate SAT is in the linear time hierarchy and is commonly conjectured to be infeasible. 
Parikh does not offer any strong reasons in the “feasibility” paper for why the concrete 
or the do-predicates should be considered feasible; however, there are at least two 
reasons that might support taking them to be feasible: firstly, they do not involve the 
use of any exponentially large numbers, and secondly, the do-predicates at least do 
not seem to be vulnerable to the kind of model-theoretic separation from addition and 
multiplication that was shown to hold for exponentiation. 
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(ii) The most important contribution of the “feasibility” paper was probably the 
definition of the theory of bounded arithmetic, denoted PB in that paper, but now 
usually denoted IAo. (We will use the modern notation in this paper.) 
Definition 1 (Parikh [30]). Ido (or PB) is the first-order theory with non-logical 
symbols 0, S, + and . and containing the axioms 
(l)O#S(X)> (5) X + S(y) = S(x + y). 
(2)S(x)=S(y)+x=y, (6) x.0=0. 
(3)x=OV3y(x=S(y)), (7) x’S(y)=x.y+x. 
(4)xfO=x. (S,,)A(O) A Vx(A(x) --j &S(x))) + V..&(x). 
where A may be any bounded formula, possibly involving free variables other than x. 
The syntactic details of defining bounded quantifiers in the language of Ido, which 
does not contain a < relation symbol, were not discussed in the “feasibility” paper, 
but presumably “x < y” was intended to abbreviate the formula “3z(x + S(z) = y)“. 
(iii) The primary evidence presented in the “feasibility” paper for the feasibility of 
bounded arithmetic is the nondefinability of functions of superlinear growth rate. Parikh 
proves this in two parts. First, he shows that there is no formula, bounded or otherwise, 
which defines exponentiation as a provably total function of IAg more precisely, 
Theorem 2 (Par&h [30]). There is no formula A(x, y,z) such that IA0 proves 
(1) VxVy3!zA(x, y,z). 
(2) ~‘x~~~z(A(x,O,l)A(A(x,y,z) -A(x,S(y),z.x))). 
(3) VxVyVz(A(x,y,z) ---f z # 0). 2 
The theorem was proven by a proof-by-contradiction using a model-theoretic ar- 
gument; namely, let N be a nonstandard model of Peano arithmetic and c( be an 
infinite integer in N. Define M to be the initial segment of N containing the integers 
of N which are less than ~8’ for some standard n E N. Then, by the absoluteness of 
do-formulas, M /= ZAo. Consider the value b such that A4 k A(cx, CI, b). From the con- 
struction of M, b < xx for some k E N. Let c be the value such that M + A(a, x - k, c). 
Then, in M, c # 0 and c ‘d = b <CC’:, which is a contradiction. 
The second result concerning the nondefinability of superlinear growth rate functions 
is the theorem commonly called “Pa&h’s theorem” in bounded arithmetic. It introduced 
the very important idea of do-definable functions: 
? Pa&h omitted condition (3) from the statement of the theorem and unfortunately the theorem is false 
without this assumption, since one may take A(*, )‘, z) to be the formula 
~XP(X. y,z) v (z = 0 A +lu(expk Y. u))), 
where exp(x,y,z) is a formula defining the graph of exponentiation 
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Theorem 3 (Parikh [30]). Zf .4(x, y) l 1~ u bounded fomulu wYth no additional ,fire 
ruriuhles, mnd (f’ Ido can proce VClyA(x, y). then ,fiv some k, I > 0. 
z/&j f jlx3y( y <XL f 1 A A(x, y)). 
Dimitracopoulos later noted that the model-theoretic proof of the previous theorem 
can readily be modified to yield a proof of this theorem; however, Parikh presented 
a proof-theoretic proof based on Herbrand’s theorem. He first noted that by adding 
Skolem functions 
.f~.r(~> 1,‘) := px(A(x, y’) vx = t) 
for all do-formulas A and all terms t = t(_?), one obtains a conservative extension PB’ of 
Ido such that PB’ is axiomatizable by universal formulas and such that any A,,-formula 
is PZ?‘-provably equivalent to a quantifier-free formula. By Herbrand’s theorem and by 
closure of the set of PB’ hnction symbols under definition by cases, it follows the 
IAMB-provability of VxZlyA(x,y) implies that there is a PB’-term t such that 
PB’ i- \JxA(x, t(x)). 
Since any PB’-term is provably bounded by a polynomial, and since PB’ is a conser- 
vative extension of IAo, the theorem follows. 
(iv) Parikh discusses as an open question the issue of whether the exponentiation 
function is required for the arithmetization of metamathematics necessary for the C&de1 
incompleteness theorems. Rephrasing his arguments slightly, he notes that if a formula 
A(x) has ,n symbols and a term t has n symbols, then the formula A(tj may have 
number of symbols proportional to m n. Hence, if an efficient Gijdel numbering is 
used, A will have GGdel number rA1 sz 2’(‘“) and t will have GGdel number rtl = 2”‘“‘. 
and therefore A(t) will have GGdel number 
The value of ‘A(t)’ cannot be bounded by a polynomial of rA1 and rtl and, as 
corollary to the previous two theorems, IA0 cannot prove that ‘A(t)’ exists from only 
the assumption that ‘A1 and rtl exist. Since the arithmetization of substitution is an 
important component of the arithmetization of metamathematics, this gives an indication 
that the usual “intensional” Giidel incompleteness theorems cannot be carried out in 
the theory /Ao. 
Subsequent developments showed, however, that full exponentiation is not needed 
for the arithmetization of metamathematics. Already, Parikh’s size analysis shows that 
only the function (x, y ) H x@ ” is needed. Wilkie and Paris [43] first noted this and 
considered the theory Ido augmented with an axiom Q, stating VX, y3=(= = .YS”‘~ ‘- ): 
they showed that all the usual arithmetization of metamathematics can be carried out 
in IA,) + 01. Later, Nelson [26] and Buss [3] used a function # of similar growth 
rate: x#y := 21’1’iI’i where 1x1 E log, x. The growth rates of Q, and the # tinction arc 
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generally felt to be much closer to multiplication than to exponentiation, and indeed, 
x”‘sY and n#y are generally viewed as feasible. 
Even without the axiom Q1 or the function #, the arithmetization of metamathematics 
and the intensional treatment of Godel’s incompleteness theorems can be (mostly) car- 
ried out in Ids. Namely, Solovay, in an unpublished 1976 letter to Hajek, showed that 
IAdo can prove the existence of a cut or initial segment of the integers which is closed 
under #. Ido can thus carry out the arithmetization of metamathematics relativized to 
this initial segment, and this is sufficient for most applications of Godel incompleteness 
theorems. (See [35, 261 for the development of this.) 
However, it is still open whether Ido can formalize the metamathematics needed for 
the Godel incompleteness theorems without the use of relativization to initial segments. 
It turns out that the substitution function is not the essential problem, but rather the 
problem is to formalize the provability predicate Thmylld,, so that Ido can prove that if 
a formula is provable, then it is provable that it is provable (in other words, so that 
the third Hilbert-Bemays-Lob derivability condition holds). 
Since Par&h’s original definition, bounded arithmetic has grown into a large and ac- 
tively studied area. In the late 1970s to mid 1980s Paris and Wilkie and other authors 
developed a large body of results on bounded arithmetic and especially its connec- 
tions to computational complexity. Of particular note is the influential paper of Paris 
and Dimitracopoulos [33] relating model-theoretic results in bounded arithmetic, Peano 
arithmetic and true arithmetic to open questions in computational complexity concem- 
ing P, NP, the polynomial time hierarchy, and polynomial space. In the mid-1980s the 
present author introduced a new formalization SZ of bounded arithmetic which is essen- 
tially equivalent to lAo+SZ, . The theory S2 contains natural subtheories Si and T; which 
can be related directly to complexity classes in the polynomial time hierarchy such as 
P and NP. Since the mid-1980s there has been extensive research on S, and related 
theories; however, it is beyond the scope of the present paper to survey this work. 
For more complete treatments of bounded arithmetic, the reader can refer to 
Wilkie-Paris [43], Buss [3], Hajek-Pudlak [16] and KrajiEek [21]. 
In addition to the aspects of Par&h’s “feasibility” paper discussed above, two ad- 
ditional topics were covered in the paper. The first topic was the description of a 
formula A which is provable in PA and therefore the formula P(A) := ThmpA(‘Al) is 
provable in PA, such that the shortest PA-proof of A is significantly longer than the 
shortest PA-proof of P(A). “Significantly longer” means that any primitive recursive 
gap between the proof lengths is obtainable. Parikh then generalized this to formu- 
las P(P(. . P(A). . .)) based on iterated use of the provability predicate. Subsequent 
research on this topic includes [ 10, 8, 6, 401. 
The second additional topic was “almost consistent theories” which are inconsistent 
theories extending PA in which the shortest proof of an inconsistency is infeasibly 
long. Let PA+ denote Peano arithmetic formalized in the usual fashion, but in a lan- 
guage containing function symbols for all primitive recursive functions and the defining 
axioms for these function symbols. Let PA: denote PA’ extended with the inclusion 
of a new unary predicate symbol F, where F(x) has the intuitive meaning “x is a 
feasible integer”, plus a finite list of axioms including (at least) 
F(O), (V’I)(F(x) * F(S(x))) 
and +(fI) for some closed term 0. The new function symbol F is not allowed to appear 
in induction formulas. The theory PA,j is obviously inconsistent, since H is closed term 
and can hence be proved to equal S’(O) for some i 3 0. However. the term 0 may ha\,e 
an extremely large value, and since F cannot be used in induction formulas, one might 
expect that any proof of an inconsistency in PAL must be extremely long. This is, in 
fact, exactly what Parikh proves in a strengthened form. Namely, he proves theorems 
stating that if PA;. k B for some PA+-formula B and if the PAZ-proof is short enough 
relative to the value of the closed term 0, then already PA- can prove B. WC will 
omit a detailed description of these theorems, but instead only remark that the value 
of II is superexponentially larger than the size of the PA;.-proof of F. Further work 
on these almost consistent theories has been done by Dragalin 11 I] and Carbonc [ 7 1. 
3. Lengths of proofs 
In the “length of proofs” paper [31], Parikh proved a remarkable theorem about 
lengths of proofs, of a type first conjectured by Kreisel. Let PA” be a formalization of 
Peano arithmetic in a first-order language with a constant symbol 0, a unary symbol 
S, and two 3-ary relation symbols A(. .) and M(. .) defining the graphs of addition 
and multiplication. PA* has axioms describing the properties of 0, S, A and M, plus 
induction for all formulas. Further assume PA* is axiomatized in a ‘*schematic” \vav 
with a finite number of axiom schemes and inference rule schemes (we will discuss 
schematic systems in more detail below). 
Proof length will be measured in terms of the number of steps, i.e.. the number of 
lines or formulas, which appear in the proof. The notation “PA” k A” mcans that ,-1 
has a PA”-proof of size at most k. Let 5 denote the term S”(O) = S(S(, S(O). )) 
with value equal to II E BJ. 
Theorem 4 (Parikh [3 I]). Let A(x) be u ,f&wwlu. Suppose there is u jised k > 0 .swh 
that PA* :A(n) for all n E W. Then PA” t V.uA(x). - 
A quick observation is that the converse of this theorem is trivially true. since 
VxA(x) + A(g) is provably in a constant number of steps, independent of A and II 
(and since any schematic system can simulate modus ponens in a constant number of 
steps). As a second observation, note that since we are measuring proof lengths in 
terms of the number steps in the proof instead of in terms of the number of symbols 
in the proof, there are infinitely many proofs of size less than or equal to h-. This is 
because a k-step proof may contain arbitrarily complex formulas. 
Now, it should be noted that Theorem 4 cannot possibly be true of all possible for- 
malizations of P.4* - indeed, since PA*‘s consequences form a recursively enumcrablc 
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set, a method of Craig’s shows that it is possible to give a recursive axiomatization of 
PA* in which every theorem of PA* has a PA*-proof in a constant number of lines. 
This is done by letting PA* be axiomatized by the formulas A A (Sk0 = S”0) where k is 
the Giidel number of a PA*-proof of A. Clearly, this axiomatization is recursive. Also, 
A can be proved from this axiom in a constant number of steps via modus ponens 
with the formula (A A (Sk0 = SkO)) + A. 
This recursive formalization of PA* is, of course, rather pathological and to avoid 
pathological axiomatizations, Parikh required that PA* be formalized as a schematic 
system. A schematic system is a formal system with a finite set of schematic rules 
modified by admissible restrictions. Rather than reproduce Par&h’s definitions, we 
present four examples of schematic rules: 
Modus Ponens. The following inference rule is a binary schematic rule: 
P P-+Q 
Q ’ 
where any formulas may be substituted for P and Q. It has no associated restrictions. 
P-t (Q- P) is a nullary schematic rule (i.e., an axiom scheme). Any formulas 
may be substituted for P and Q and it has no associated restrictions. 
VxP(x) 3 P(t) is another nullary schematic rule. Any formula may be substituted 
for P and any variable for x and any term for t, provided t is free for x in P. The 
condition “t is free for x in P” is the admissible restriction modifying this schematic 
inference rule. 
P(0) A Vx(P(x) + P(S(x))) + VxP( x IS another example of a schematic inference ) 
rule. Again, any formula may be substituted for P and any variable for x. It has 
the associated admissible restriction that “x does not appear bound in P”. 
Other types of admissible restrictions are possible other than the above example. 
They include, for instance, “x does not occur in P” and “x does not occur free 
in P”. 
To properly define schematic systems, Parikh needed to augment the language of 
first-order logic with special “formula variables ” “term variables” and “meta-variables”. , 
A schematic rule and its associated admissible restrictions are expressed in the aug- 
mented language; a substitution is a mapping from the formula variables, term variables 
and metavariables to formulas, terms and variables (respectively). Then, a schematic 
rule indicates that any substitution instance of the rule is a valid inference provided 
the substitution satisfies the conditions of the associated admissible restrictions. 
It is an important property of schematic systems that they are specified by only a 
finite set of schematic rules. For instance, this excludes the pathological axiomatiza- 
tion of PA* discussed above. Examples of schematic proof systems include the usual 
Hilbert-style proof systems. (The Gentzen sequent calculus is not strictly speaking a 
schematic system; however, by slightly extending the definition of schematic systems, 
it can also be viewed as a schematic system.) 
We will now sketch the main ideas of the proof of Theorem 4. For this proof, it is 
necessary to circumvent the problem of having infinitely many proofs of k steps. To- 
S. R. Bussl Annals oj’ Purr anti Applied Logic 96 (1999) 43 -55 51 
ward this end, Parikh introduced the important notion of a proof analysis (subsequently 
called a “proof skeleton” or “proof scheme” by other researchers). 
A proof analysis describes a (possible) proof by giving a precise statement about 
which schematic rule is used to derive each line in the proof, including a specification of 
which earlier lines in the proof (if any) were used as hypotheses to the rule. However, 
a proof analysis does not list the precise formulas and terms appearing in the proof. 
It is an easy observation that there are only finitely many proof analyses for proof of 
size at most k. 
Of course, every proof has a proof analysis, but not every proof analysis corresponds 
to an actual proof. However, Parikh shows that for PA” it is decidable whether a given 
proof analysis corresponds to an actual proof of a given formula. For this, hc first 
establishes the following: 
Lemma 5 (Parikh [3 1, Lemma A]). Given u k-step proqf’ unal~lsis %, one can eftix- 
ticel?, produce (I sequence of formulas F,, . . , F,,. G,, , G,,,, H and a ,finite set K c!f’ 
udmissihle restrictions so thut aq, formulu A has u proqf’u.ith analj,sis 91 [fund onl~~ if’ 
there is u substitution .fP satisjjiny Y( F;) = .9’( G, ) ,f 01 ~11 i and .‘Y(H) = A crnd sutisfj,- 
iny the restrictions in K. Furthermore, .f?w any such substitution, .Y(F, ), . .Y(Fk ). A 
is u valid proqf’ of A and, conversel?.. uny proqf’ of A M,ith proqf una1J.si.v 91 cun hr 
obtained in this ki’a)l. 
Lemma 5 holds for any schematic proof system, not just for PA*. It is proved by 
induction on k, and we shall omit the proof here. The number m turns out to bc <C k 
where c is the maximum number of hypotheses in a schematic rule. 
The problem of determining whether there is a substitution that makes formulas E 
equal to G, is a kind of unification problem with the admissible restrictions placing 
extra conditions on the solution of the unification problem. Thus, Lemma 5 states 
that the question of whether a proof analysis corresponds to an actual proof of ,3 is 
equivalent to a unification problem. 
Lemma 6 (Parikh [31, Lemma B]). Given u proof’ unall,sis 91 .fbr the theor)‘ PA’ 
und a .ftirmulu A(x), one can @ecticelJ. jind u ,ftirmuia Bg,(.u) in the languaye of 
freshurger arithmetic such that (PA” prol;es thut) for all n E N, B,!,(n) is true if und 
onLy if' A(n) has u PA*-proof’ with pro~~f anal~~sis ‘3. 
Lemma 6 is proved by showing that the unification problem of Lemma 5 can be 
rephrased as a formula of Presburger arithmetic. It is useful to split this unification 
into two parts: the first part is an ordinary unification of the type due to Herbrand 
[ 181 and Robinson [37], which is sometimes called “first-order” unification. This part 
of the unification problem can be solved to get the log&l and relationul structure of 
all the formulas in a (simplest possible) proof with analysis PI. That is to say, we can 
solve a first-order unification problem to determine the logical symbols (propositional 
connectives and quantifiers but not the identity of the quantified variables) and all the 
relation symbols (= , A and M; undetermined relations may be set to “= ” 1. 
52 S. R. Buss1 Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 96 (1999) 43-55 
The remaining part of the unification problem is a special case of “second-order 
unification” and it is the problem of determining which terms must appear in a proof 
with analysis 8. The second-order unification problem is find terms tr , . , t,l satisfying 
conditions such as 
(i) t; = ti, 
(ii) t; = S'(tj), 
(iii) t,(x/ti) = tk, 
(iv) ti = S”(O), 
where, since we are working with PA*, each ti is of the form ti = S’lO or t, = S’i(x,,,) 
where li, v, 20 and x,.~ is a variable. There are, up to renaming of variables, only finitely 
many choices for the innermost symbols 0 or x~, of ti. Fixing one such choice, finding 
a solution of the unification problem reduces to finding an integer solution to a set of 
simultaneous equations of the forms 
(i’) Z; = 11 (provided V, = vj), 
(ii’) I, = r + I, (provided V; = vi), 
(iii’) Z; + l/ = lk (provided x =xI; and v, = v,+), 
(iv’) l; = r (provided 0 was chosen instead of a variable x~, ). 
Since Presburger arithmetic includes 0, S and f, the property of being able to satisfy 
equations of the forms (i’)-(iv’) is expressible by a formula of Presburger arithmetic 
(in fact, by an existential formula). We get at most one such Presburger arithmetic 
formula for each set of choices of innermost symbols of t;; and, for each such choice 
it is easy to check whether the admissible restrictions will be satisfied. Thus, the 
formula &i(n) is defined to be the disjunction of these Presburger arithmetic formulas 
for choices of the O/x,, values for which a substitution could give a valid proof. 
The above argument concludes our outline of the proof of Lemma 6. From this 
lemma, Theorem 4 follows readily by observing the following facts: (1) There are 
only finitely many proof analyses 2I for proofs of size less than or equal to k. Thus, 
taking the disjunction of finitely many formulas &i gives a Presburger arithmetic for- 
mula B~.k(n) expressing the condition A(n) has a proof of size <k. (2) Presburger 
arithmetic is complete. Therefore if A(n) has a PA*-proof of d k steps for all n, the 
Presburger formula BA,k(n) is true for all IZ E N and by completeness, VxB~,k(x) is 
provable in Presburger arithmetic and hence in PA*. (3) From the solution of the 
first-order portion of the unification problem, there is a uniform upper bound on the 
quantifier complexity needed in PA*-proofs of A of size <k. It follows that PA* 
proves that every instance of A(n) has a PA*-proof of bounded logical complexity. 
Finally, Theorem 4 follows by the reflexivity of PA*; that is to say, by the fact that 
Peano arithmetic proves the reflection principle for formulas proved by proofs with a 
constant upper bound on their logical complexity. 
As a corollary to the method of proof of Theorem 4 above, we get 
Theorenj.7 (Par&h [31]). Let A(x) be a PA*-formula and k E N. Then the set 
{nIPA* E A(g)} consists of a jinite set of integers plus a jinite union of arithmetic 
progressions. 
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The “length of proofs” paper concluded with a proof of a special case of a theorem 
stated by Gadel in his lengths of proofs paper [14]. Let PA,” denote kth order arithmetic 
in the language 0, S, A,M. Thus, PA; = PA* and PA: is a system of analysis. 
Theorem 8 (Parikh [31]). PAS has unbounded proof speedup owr PA;. 
The theorem is proved by noting that PAS proves Con( PA*), but PA” does not. 
Let Con(PA”,n) be a formula stating that there is no PAX-proof of 0 = 1 of size less 
than or equal to n. Then there is a uniform upper bound on the size of the shortest 
PA;-proofs of Con(PA*,rz), with the same upper bound applying for all values of 
12. But, by Theorem 4, there is no uniform upper bound on the size of the shortest 
PA*-proofs of Con(PA*,g) since otherwise PA* would prove its own consistency. 
GGdel actually stated that (k+ 1)th order arithmetic has unbounded speedup over kth 
order arithmetic; however, he gave no proof of this. Parikh extended the unbounded 
speedup in [32], showing that PA;,, has unbounded speedup over PA,*. Buss [5] later 
established the same results for Peano arithmetic formulated in the usual style with 
addition and multiplication as function symbols. 
Since the “length of proofs” paper [31] there has been a large number of papers 
dealing with the lengths of first-order proofs. The results in this area are too numer- 
ous to list them all, so we mention only a few of the papers most closely related 
to Parikh’s work. Richardson [36], Yukami [46, 471 and Miyatake [25, 241 gave cx- 
tensions of Parikh’s work on proof lengths. Krajieek [20] sharpened the bounds on 
the logical complexity of formulas in proofs of bounded size. Goldfarb [ 151 proved 
the undecidability of general second-order unification when arbitrary function symbols 
are allowed in place of the single unary functions symbol S. Farmer [ 12, 131 proved the 
decidability of second-order monadic unification where all function symbols are unary 
and gave applications to lengths of proofs. Orevkov [28, 2’91 and Krajieek-Pudl6k 1221 
established the undecidability of the problem of determining whether a proof analysis 
corresponds to an actual proof. Buss [4] proved the undecidability of the k-step prov- 
ability problem for a particular version of the Gentzen sequent calculus. (It is still open 
whether the k-step provability problem is undecidable for all schematic formulations 
of first-order logic or Peano arithmetic with a binary function symbol in the language.) 
Finally, Baas and Pudlik [l] proved Kreisel’s conjecture for the theory IX with the 
least number principle for Cl -formulas. 
4. Feasible arithmetic and proof lengths 
At first glance, the two topics of feasibility in theories of arithmetic and of length of 
first-order proofs seem to have little in common. However, subsequent to the publica- 
tion of the two papers of Par&h’s, surprisingly close connections have been discovered 
between bounded arithmetic and proof length. Firstly, Paris and Wilkie [34] give a 
direct translation between provability in Ido and provability in constant depth proposi- 
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tional theories. Secondly, Cook [9] introduced an equational theory PV of polynomial 
time computable functions and showed that PV-proofs can be translated into schematic 
propositional proofs; thus, by the conservativity of Sj over PV [3], the same holds for 
proofs in the fragment $ of bounded arithmetic. In this way, there are two ways of 
obtaining direct connections between provability in theories of bounded arithmetic and 
lengths of proofs in propositional logic: this has led to renewed interest in the lengths 
of proofs in both propositional and first-order logic, and a large number of significant 
results in this area have been obtained, largely inspired by the connections to computa- 
tional complexity. It is beyond the scope of this paper to survey this research, but the 
book length treatment by KrajiEek [21] contains a comprehensive and fairly up-to-date 
treatment of recent progress in this area. 
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